So, the currently in vogue phrase is “Gulf monarchies”, and although some of their leaders are emir, one is sultan, a few are sheikh, and only two are “king”, I guess it works as a way of grouping the dynasties together. They certainly want to be grouped together. The Gulf, they often say, is different. Family rule suits the particular social and political circumstances of the countries involved. With this appeal to khususiyya, the Gulf rulers are circling the wagons. The Arab countries that have witnessed upheaval are republics, with fundamentally different political systems – Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen. As far as Al Saud are concerned, Bahrain only witnessed protests because of the deviance of the Shia and the meddling of Iran: If the republics were descending into de facto hereditary polities, that just shows the wisdom of the Gulf way, as Tareq al-Humayyid wrote in Asharq al-Awsat in February. (It’s a bit more complicated: the families in charge generally come to a concensus among themselves on who among brothers and sons of rulers has the qualities to maintain the stability of the state and continued rule of the family.)

Yemen has been kept out of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) because it does not fit the pattern of conservative family rule. It’s not the only reason – the fact that it has a large and diverse population also counts. Many of the ruling dynasties of the GCC, moreover, are tied together by family bonds. The Kuwaiti Sabahs, the Bahraini Khalifas, the Qatari Thanis and Al Saud all claim Najdi origin and have intermarried. The UAE families are out of this cosy circle but share the same mentality. They all look askance at the Omanis for several reasons (non Bedouin background, Ibadi Islam, etc.), but they share more characteristics with the club to warrant membership than Yemen.

Or they do? These boundaries and definitions are not so clearly demarked upon closer inspection. Jizan and Asir share cultural and geographical similarities with Yemen and Yemen for long considered those regions as unfair annexations by Abdelaziz (Ibn Saud). If Gulf family rule is about mediating tribes, much of Yemen is much part of that as anywhere else in the Arabian Peninsula. Jeddah and the Hejaz cities also have long civil traditions that the Najd-based Saudi-Wahhabi polity laboured away intensively on neutralising. The ultimate irony is that Yemen may not be GCC but the Saudi family is still doing its best to preserve if not Ali Abdullah Saleh himself in power then maintain his Arab republicanism-with-a-family-twist. A Yemeni with the delegation in Riyadh where his 60 days outside Yemen are almost up (onward August 7!) said the other day that King Abdullah is pushing for Saleh to hold on in order to secure the “dignified exit” that Saleh himself hinted at before, because the prospect of another Arab ruler falling isn’t pleasant for the oligarchy, nor the precedent of an Arabian Peninsula ruler and direct neighbour forced from power. So much for “Gulf”.   

Saudi Arabia pulled a fast one on the GCC with its declaration that Jordan and Morocco could be part of the club. Saudi Arabia maintains close relations with Jordanian tribes with extensions into Saudi territory. This gives some more sense to the rather simple calculation Riyadh made that is was worth making common cause with Jordan as a monarchy in the face of the democracy protest movements and bringing into the protective bosom of Gulf political cover and petrodollars. But Morocco? King Mohammed VI may have inherited rule from his father and intend to pass it on to a son – though his and the Hashemites claim to descent from the Prophet irritates the hell out of Al Saud – but Morocco has a larger society with a modern history of civic involvement and political participation than Jordan, Saudi Arabia or any of the other monarch. They will probably never join the GCC anyway, but it’s a sign of desperation when regimes make these sorts of blatant play for protection and shoring up of support.