An arresting set of US diplomatic cables from the Sanaa embassy have been released recently by Wikileaks concerning Saudi-Yemeni relations. They paint a picture of Yemen as a country President Ali Abdullah Saleh has reduced to vassal status with the “big brother” Saudi Arabia, which comes off as a spoiler that has done little good for the country. Many might wonder why Saleh as a Zaydi Shi’ite would facilitate Wahhabi (Salafi) influence in Yemen. An opposition academic seems to nail it in this comment – Wahhabi obedience to a “just” (Sharia-friendly) ruler (square brackets are mine):

“Professor Mohamed Mutawakel of the opposition Union of Popular Forces (and an active leader within the JMP -[the opposition Joint Meeting Parties umbrella group]) told PolE Chief that he believes the Saleh regime is actively seeking to increase the prevalence of Salafi teachings in Yemen. When PolE Chief asked why Saleh, who is from a predominantly Zaydi (Shia) area, would advance the interests of a foreign Sunni religious group, Mutawakel explained that Salafis believe that as long as a government is in any way Islamic, Muslims should not try to overthrow it. Zaydi teaching, by contrast, admonishes adherents to work to change any government that fails to ‘achieve justice.’ Mutawakel believes, as do other embassy contacts, that the ROYG [republic of Yemen government] considers a Salafi presence as a pacifying force in a country facing unrest in both the north and south.” (18 June 2008)

The cable, which like most of them bears a sign-off by then ambassador Stephen A. Seche (he left the post last year), talks of how despite the close relationship Saleh has built with Riyadh, he and other Yemenis are still treated with disdain.

“Shaykh Mohammed Naji al-Shaif, a senior GPC [ruling party] Member of Parliament and an apparent heir to be the Bakil Shaykh of Shaykhs (Note: The Bakil, the most populous tribal confederation in Yemen, are concentrated along the Saudi border. End Note.) told the Ambassador that President Saleh had hoped to be close to Saudi King Abdullah. He added that the al-Sauds had ‘played with Saleh before, but now they know him’ and so Saleh finds himself on official visits to Saudi Arabia meeting Crown Prince Sultan instead.”

It says that Saleh, now Abdullah’s “guest”, still tried to resist on of Saudi Arabia’s great strategic goals in Yemen: a passage to the Arabian Sea. He explains that Saudi Arabia hopes that by paying off tribes it can on day lay a pipeline to Aden from Saudi Arabia, thus bypassing oil exports through the Gulf—a strategic goal that Ismaili Shi’ites in the Najran region of Saudi Arabia have told me before partly explains Saudi government policies of repression against them in favour of settling Yemeni tribes and offering them nationality (remind you of somewhere??) The cable says:

“A British diplomat based in Yemen told PolOff that Saudi Arabia had an interest to build a pipeline, wholly owned, operated and protected by Saudi Arabia, through Hadramaut to a port on the Gulf of Aden, thereby bypassing the Arabian Gulf/Persian Gulf and the straits of Hormuz. Saleh has always opposed this. The diplomat contended that Saudi Arabia, through supporting Yemeni military leadership, paying for the loyalty of shaykhs and other means, was positioning itself to ensure it would, for the right price, obtain the rights for this pipeline from Saleh’s successor.”

It depicts Saudi Arabia in a continuing losing battle with the Yemenis over illegal immigration, constantly deporting Yemenis on Saudi Arabian Airlines flights back to Sanaa. It says that in 2007 as many as 400,000 Yemenis were deported, a huge figure.

Another cable from 31 August 2009  reveals striking warnings by Hamid al-Ahmar, the Islah party figure and businessman son of late Saleh ally Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, that Saleh was increasingly isolated through promotion of his sons and nephews – “clowns” – to key positions, corruption and brute force with enemies that a mass protest movement should be organised to force him out of power. The diplomats involved show disdain for the idea and depict al-Ahmar as driven by boredom and perhaps slightly deranged. But he still manages to tell them, intelligently enough, that a southerner is needed to unify the country. He tells US diplomats that Saudi Arabia is not convinced.

“Denying any personal ambition to lead the country, Ahmar said that Yemen needs a president from one of the southern governorates and that the Saudis would eventually come around to the idea.”

Houthi hi-jinks  

In other cables from November 2009, diplomats express concern with Saudi policy towards the Houthi rebellion which at that time was five years old and had escalated to a new level of violence with Saleh’s “Operaton Scorched Earth” to crush the Zaydi Shi’ite movement in the north. One says from 11 November Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were making things worse by sending “millions of dollars” of weaponry to Saleh’s army. Riyadh’s idea of militarily defeating the Houthis was “delusional”, it said. “This line of thinking, that the Houthi rebellion can be ‘finished’ militarily, is both dangerous and delusional,” it says. Another expresses fear that with its state-of-art weaponry, Saudi Arabia “may not react rationally and may begin targeting villages, markets, and other civilian gathering places in order to root out the insurgents”.

Saleh’s claims of Iranian involvement, including the infamous shipment of weapons seized near Hudaidah, was unproven, the cables say: the real danger was a “tidal wave” of Saudi and UAE arms. The report says:

“Most recently, the ROYG has failed to substantiate its extravagant, public claims that an Iranian ship seized in the Red Sea off its coast on Oct 25 was carrying Iranian military trainers, weapons and explosives destined for the Houthis. In fact, sensitive reporting (RefC) suggests that the ship was carrying no weapons at all. It is, in fact, the amount of weapons the SAG and at least one other neighboring state, the UAE, seem intent on throwing at the Yemeni government that strikes us as a cause for serious concern. We know that the Saudis have agreed to provide the ROYG with APCs, weapons and ammunition and to assist in the purchase of helicopters for the YAF. In addition, we understand KSA is offering to purchase weapons and ammo from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and that the UAE has agreed to broker a similar deal with Bulgaria. We believe this tidal wave of arms into Yemen, a nation already awash in weapons, will encourage President Saleh to continue to reject any suggestion that he attempt to find a negotiated solution to his government’s conflict with the Houthis, and prolong a clumsy military effort that has destroyed much of Sa’ada’s infrastructure and created an IDP population in excess of 150,000 people with no evidence that he is any closer to dominating the Houthis than he was five years ago.”

It goes on: 

“We urge the Department to engage in Washington and in relevant capitals to convey to these ‘friends of Yemen’ that they are undermining their goal of a stable and secure Yemen by providing large amounts of money and military assistance to President Saleh.”

I pasted the text of the four cables I refer to below:

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SANAA 001053

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS SA YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN'S BIG BROTHER: WHAT HAS SAUDI ARABIA DONE
FOR YEMEN LATELY?

REF: A. IIR 6 906 0126 07
¶B. IIR 6 906 0078 08
¶C. IIR 6 906 0051 08
¶D. IIR 6 906 0041 08
¶E. SANAA 517
¶F. SANAA 385
¶G. IIR 6 906 0305 07

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (U) AMEMBASSY Riyadh and AMCONGEN Jeddah have cleared this
cable.

Summary
-------

¶2. (C) Yemen has a long history of relations with Saudi
Arabia based primarily on their 1500 km shared border, which
has led to extensive social, religious and business ties.
Yemenis perceive the relationship as heavily balanced in
favor of Saudi Arabia, which remains involved in Yemen, to
the extent necessary, to counter the potential threat of
Yemen's unemployed masses, poor security, unrest, crime and
the intentions of foreign countries (Libya and Iran) that
might create a threat on Saudi Arabia's southern border.
Yemen, on the other hand, growls at the hand that might feed
it. It is resentful of Saudi Arabia's preeminence and is
weary of Saudi involvement in its domestic affairs. Despite
this, Yemen receives substantial development assistance from
Saudi Arabia and seeks Saudi help to open doors to
organizations it wants to join, like the Gulf Cooperation
Council. Consequently, Yemen has, on occasion, swallowed its
resentment and acquiesced to Saudi wishes. END SUMMARY.

Security
--------

¶3. (U) The independent English language newspaper Yemen
Observer reported in November 2007 that Saudi King Abdullah
Bin Abdulaziz said Yemen's security is "inseparable" from the
Kingdom's security. Yemenis see this as both a signal of
solidarity and a cause for concern, for if inseparable then
Saudi Arabia has cause to meddle in Yemeni affairs.
Extremists and terrorist elements are active in Yemen, and
the lack of central authority in Yemen means that Yemen is a
fertile breeding ground and a potential training area for
extremists.

¶4. (U) Rumors persist in Yemen that Saudis fund many of
Yemen's internal conflicts. Saudi Arabia supported and
funded royalist forces in Yemen in the 1962 revolutionary war
against Egyptian-backed republicans. Again in the 1994 civil
war, Saudi Arabia supported the southern secessionists
against the Saleh government. "Elaph.com" reported on
November 14, 2007, that King Abdullah met with Yemeni
opposition figures in London, lending credence to Yemeni
allegations of Saudi interference in current North-South
relations. Yemeni privately-owned newspaper al-Shari' wrote
that senior Saudi officials met exiled Yemeni leadership in
August 2007, opining that these meetings usurped Saleh's
attempts to secure meetings with the same exiled Yemenis.
Al-Shari' asserted that this interference gave Saudi Arabia a
degree of control over the developments in the south.

¶5. (S) The ROYG has been unable to resolve its conflict with
the al-Houthi Zaydi adherents in Saada, which borders Saudi
Arabia. According to a Yemen-based Saudi official (ref A),
Saudi Arabia doubled its border guards along the Saada border
in March 2007 due to fighting. In a worst case scenario the
al-Houthi conflict could spill over the border, requiring a
Saudi reaction.

¶6. (C) Basha Bashraheel, editor and owner of Aden-based
independent newspaper al-Ayyam, alleges that private Saudi
nationals are helping the al-Houthis in their fight against
the ROYG, a claim echoed by Majid al-Fahed, the Executive
Director of the NGO Civic Democratic Initiatives Support
Foundation (CDF). Al-Fahed, a Saada native, said that most
tribes in Saada are part of the larger tribal confederation
of Qudah, most of whom live in Saudi Arabia but who retain
tribal loyalties. On the other hand, Hassan Zaid, leader of
the banned al-Haq party (a Zaydi party accused by the ROYG of
being pro-Houthi), told PolOff that the ROYG received
official Saudi assistance to pursue the war.

Counterterrorism
----------------

¶7. (U) Saudi Arabia and Yemen praise their cooperation on
counterterrorism, but give few details. The Saudi News
Agency reported on November 13 that Crown Prince Sultan said
Yemen and Saudi Arabia were jointly fighting 'deviant

SANAA 00001053 002 OF 005

thought' that was at the root of terrorism. On March 27, AFP
reported that Yemen handed over to Saudi Arabia four Saudi
nationals suspected of ties to al-Qaida. Since signing a
2003 extradition agreement, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have
exchanged dozens of terror suspects. ROYG successes in
counterterrorism over 2007 pale in comparison with Saudi
Arabia's. To date, Yemen appears to have learnt and gained
little from the two countries' cooperation.

Illegal Immigrants
------------------

¶8. (S) Bashraheel told PolOff that, during the month of
December 2007, Saudi Arabia chartered one or two Saudi
Arabian Airlines jumbo jets per night to return Yemeni
illegal immigrants to the Sana'a airport at Saudi expense.
He added that most of these illegal immigrants turned around
and crossed back over the border. Saudi Ambassador to Yemen
Ali bin Muhammad al-Hamdan reiterated these statements to
PolE Chief, saying he considered illegal immigration to be
the biggest issue in the bilateral relationship. Al-Hamdan
noted that 10,000 illegal immigrants try to cross the border
each month. He confirmed that Saudi Arabia repatriated as
many as 400,000 Yemenis in 2007. There are up to 800,000
legal Yemeni residents in Saudi Arabia, necessitating
constant ROYG dialogue with the Saudi government. These
Yemenis make it easier for illegal Yemenis to blend in and
find work and a place to live in Saudi Arabia.

How Yemenis think Saudi Arabia Sees Them
----------------------------------------

¶9. (S) Yemenis are aware that other Arab nationalities,
including Saudis, see them as backward uncivilized people.
In ref B, Yemeni Colonel Handhal, commander of al-Badieh
military airfield near the Saudi border, said that Saudis
treat Yemenis as second class citizens. This second class
designation may extend to the official level as well. Shaykh
Mohammed Naji al-Shaif, a senior GPC Member of Parliament and
an apparent heir to be the Bakil Shaykh of Shaykhs (Note: The
Bakil, the most populous tribal confederation in Yemen, are
concentrated along the Saudi border. End Note.) told the
Ambassador that President Saleh had hoped to be close to
Saudi King Abdullah. He added that the al-Sauds had "played
with Saleh before, but now they know him" and so Saleh finds
himself on official visits to Saudi Arabia meeting Crown
Prince Sultan instead.

Smuggling and the Border
------------------------

¶10. (U) Saudi Arabia and Yemen successfully concluded border
demarcation talks in 2000. Actual border demarcation,
however, continued until 2006. Border authorities from both
sides held a first meeting on August 12-14, 2007 to discuss
technical assistance. Yemen now attends monthly border
security meetings with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Yemen
claimed, in a November 15 article by Malaysian official news
agency Bernama, to have continuous and direct information
exchange on nationals crossing the border. A SABA news
article from January 8 quoted Saudi Deputy Minister of Trade
and Industry Abdullah al-Hamoudi saying Yemen and Saudi
Arabia "would discuss issues of unifying administrative
procedures to facilitate the process of transporting goods."
SABA reported on January 9 that Saudi Arabia would provide
Yemen with x-ray machines at all its border crossings with
Yemen.

¶11. (C) On a less positive note, on January 12 the Yemen
Observer newspaper reported Saudi Arabia began erecting
barriers, including ditches and barbed wire, on a part of the
border susceptible to illegal crossings, which triggered
mobilization by Yemeni and Saudi border guards. (COMMENT:
Though Yemeni authorities later disavowed the story, aerial
photographs and protests by Yemenis resident along the border
suggest animosities were real. END COMMENT.)

¶12. (S) Post reported in ref C that an Indian Military
Advisor to Saudi Arabia, Colonel Raj S. Yadav, said that
Saudi-Yemeni relations were passive-aggressive, adding that
Saudi Arabia would like Yemen to do more on the Saudi-Yemen
border, but isn't willing to force Yemen to tighten its
borders. Major General Mohammed Ali Mohsen Saleh, a half
brother to Yemeni President Saleh and Eastern Regional
Commander, admitted that though Yemeni-Saudi cooperation was
good, the border was just too big and there were just not
enough soldiers to adequately monitor all of it (ref D).

¶13. (U) There is substantial smuggling across the
Yemeni-Saudi border, which enriches Yemenis. The Associated
Press reported on February 6 that between October and
December 2007, Saudi authorities arrested 880 alleged

SANAA 00001053 003 OF 005

smugglers, many of whom were Yemenis, along this border. In
that same period, Saudi border authorities captured 100
kilograms of explosives, 400 weapons, 50,000 pieces of
ammunition, 100 sticks of dynamite, 2,000 kilograms of
hashish, four kilograms of marijuana and 40,000 pills.
Yemeni News Agency reported on January 25 that Yemeni police
seized around 600 kilograms of hashish in Amran governorate
in northern Yemen close to the Saudi border. (COMMENT:
Since Qat is the drug of choice in Yemen, the hashish was
mostly likely bound for Saudi Arabia. END COMMENT.)

Agreement on International Issues
---------------------------------

¶14. (U) Yemen agrees with Saudi Arabia on many issues
pertaining to the Arab world, including how to resolve the
Darfur crisis in Sudan, condemnation of political
assassinations in Lebanon, what is needed to prevent nuclear
proliferation in Iran, appeals to Somalia for peace,
non-proliferation and nuclear inspections for Israel, and the
importance of Iraqi unity, sovereignty, security and
stability. Going further, Yemen's recent venture into the
Palestinian Hamas/Fatah divide (ref E) is seen in some Yemeni
circles as an extension of Saudi Arabia's own proposal for
Arab-Israeli peace.

¶15. (U) Despite their general agreement on issues, Yemen
Today magazine reported in its March issue that Saudi Arabia
is one of the opposing voices to Yemen's desire for accession
to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Nonetheless, Yemen
has won Saudi approval for membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO).

¶16. (C) The ROYG intended to go to the Arab League Summit in
Syria, but after Saudi Arabia spoke to the ROYG, Saleh
announced in March that Yemen would not be represented at the
head of state level (ref F). (Comment: Yemen's willingness
to acquiesce to Saudi wishes deserves more study by the USG
in our attempts to advance USG interests in Yemen. End
Comment.)

Development Assistance
----------------------

¶17. (U) Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gulf and Arab
Countries Department Head Ambassador Abdulkader Hadi told
PolOff that Saudi Arabia is one of Yemen's most important
development-assistance donors. At the November 2006 London
conference, which Saudi Arabia was instrumental in
organizing, Saudi Arabia pledged USD 1 billion to Yemen. The
English-language Yemen Times newspaper on November 14, 2007
reported that at a mid-November conference between the two
countries Saudi Arabia donated USD 652 million to Yemen's
development including improving facilities at four hospitals,
a power plant in Marib and a number of technical training
centers. Arab News reported on November 15 that the Saudi
government signed additional contracts for locust control
(training Yemeni and providing vehicles and equipment) and to
finance Saudi exports to Yemen.

¶18. (U) Yemen also receives training and exchange
opportunities from Saudi Arabia. Arab News reported on
November 15 that Saudi Arabia was increasing scholarships for
Yemenis from 100 to 150. (Comment: These scholarships may be
intended for Yemenis resident in Saudi Arabia. End Comment.)
The article went on to report that seats at Saudi
universities for Yemeni expatriate students went up from 20
to 50 and an additional 25 Yemenis would be given admission
to Saudi technical and vocational training institutes.
Yemen's official news agency SABA further reported on
February 25 agreements for mutual visits, exchanges and
seminars at colleges of petroleum and minerals in Yemeni
universities.

Tribal Assistance
-----------------

¶19. (S) Yemen's proximity to Saudi Arabia and their history
means that many tribes in Yemen share common ancestry with
Saudi tribes. Yemenis contend the Saudis are paying shaykhs
in Yemen for information, to ensure leverage over Yemeni
domestic politics and for the allegiance of the shaykhs and
their tribes. Bashraheel told PolOff that the now deceased
Paramount Shaykh of the Hashid Confederation, Shaykh Abdullah
al-Ahmar, had been receiving large payments from the Saudi
government. He contended these payments would now be paid to
his son Shaykh Hussayn Abdullah al-Ahmar. Nabil Basha, a GPC
member of Parliament, corroborated this, adding that Hussayn
was receiving three to four billion Yemeni riyals a month --
less than his late father, who reportedly received seven
billion Yemeni riyals a month. While few contacts are
willing to speculate on the total sum Saudis pay annually to

SANAA 00001053 004 OF 005

Yemeni shaykhs, Saudi Arabia's 2007 national day reception
suggests that these Yemeni contentions are probably not far
off the mark. Almost every shaykh of any stature was
invited, leaving the diplomatic community as a side event
(ref G).

Saudis of Hadrami Origin
------------------------

¶20. (C) Another interesting dynamic in the Yemeni-Saudi
relationship is the large number of affluent Saudi nationals
of Yemeni, more precisely Hadrami (from Hadramout
Governorate), descent. According to Saudi Ambassador Ali
al-Hamdan, these families and other Yemenis in Saudi Arabia
send considerable amounts of money to their extended families
in Yemen.

¶21. (U) Hadrami Saudis include the billionaire families Bin
Laden (family wealth is estimated at USD 5 billion), Bin
Mahfouz (USD 4 billion) and Bouqshan Shaykh Abdullah Ahmed
Bouqshan (personal worth is USD 3.2 billion). On March 26
and 27, Shaykh Bouqshan sponsored an investment conference in
Hadramaut. In a Yemen Today magazine interview from March
2008, Bouqshan said since his first visit to his ancestral
homeland in 2002, he has completed large development
projects, including a road network, an electrical network,
four schools and a hospital for his home town in Wadi Do'an.
He has invested USD 305 million in companies in cement, fish
and tourism, and is now considering investing in a
petrochemical plant in Yemen.

Economic Integration
---------------------

¶22. (U) The Yemen Observer reported on January 12 that the
ROYG was establishing three free commercial and economic
border zones, two of them with Saudi Arabia. These zones are
aimed to combat poverty and unemployment. (Note: Vocational
training centers for Yemenis are to be collocated. End Note.)
Yemen Today reported that Yemeni illegal migrants could
cause "embarrassing political situations... if they (GCC)
opened their markets to Yemeni laborers," and said this could
be offset by offering employment locally. The Yemen Observer
reported on March 30 that Saudi groups desired to invest in
free trade zones in Yemen and construction projects,
including projects on the island of Socotra.

Oil and the Yemeni Succession
-----------------------------

¶23. (C) A British diplomat based in Yemen told PolOff that
Saudi Arabia had an interest to build a pipeline, wholly
owned, operated and protected by Saudi Arabia, through
Hadramaut to a port on the Gulf of Aden, thereby bypassing
the Arabian Gulf/Persian Gulf and the straits of Hormuz.
Saleh has always opposed this. The diplomat contended that
Saudi Arabia, through supporting Yemeni military leadership,
paying for the loyalty of shaykhs and other means, was
positioning itself to ensure it would, for the right price,
obtain the rights for this pipeline from Saleh's successor.

Religion and Unrest
-------------------

¶24. (C) Wahabism, teachings from the Hanbali school of Islam
that predominate in Saudi Arabia, is becoming more
influential in Yemen. Locally referred to as Salafis,
followers of Wahabism are taking key positions in a number of
Yemeni institutions. Ali Muhsen al-Ahmar, the Northwest
military commander and one of the prime contenders to succeed
Saleh, has long been recruiting Salafist soldiers to fight
al-Houthi insurgents in Saada. (Note: Salafis are Sunni and
the al-Houthis are Shia. End Note.) Increasingly
conservative in his actions, Ali Muhsin is considered a
Salafi by many. Secretary General Hassan Zaid of the banned
al-Haq party told PolE Chief that the opposition Islah party
is now almost exclusively Salafist with only a few token
moderates. (Note: Zaid's al-Haq party is a co-member of the
opposition Joint Meeting Parties with Islah. End Note.)
Mohamed Aboulahoum of the GPC told PolE/E Chief recently that
there were now ten Salafi-controlled mosques in Sana'a, with
lesser numbers in other major Yemeni cities. He pointed out
that the mosque near him has space for 150 students in its
school. He noted that if the other mosques are equally
equipped, then Salafi-controlled mosques have the potential
to turn out 1,500 ardent Salafists in the capital alone.
"That's how they will increase their influence," he said.

¶25. (C) Professor Mohamed Mutawakel of the opposition Union
of Popular Forces (and an active leader within the JMP) told
PolE Chief that he believes the Saleh regime is actively
seeking to increase the prevalence of Salafi teachings in

SANAA 00001053 005 OF 005

Yemen. When PolE Chief asked why Saleh, who is from a
predominantly Zaydi (Shia) area, would advance the interests
of a foreign Sunni religious group, Mutawakel explained that
Salafis believe that as long as a government is in any way
Islamic, Muslims should not try to overthrow it. Zaydi
teaching, by contrast, admonishes adherents to work to change
any government that fails to "achieve justice." Mutawakel
believes, as do other embassy contacts, that the ROYG
considers a Salafi presence as a pacifying force in a country
facing unrest in both the north and south.

COMMENT
-------

¶26. (C) There would appear to the room for the USG to work
with Saudi Arabia to influence the Yemeni regime to address
short-comings in Yemen's counterterrorism efforts and
security, both areas in which Saudi Arabia has shown
capacity. They include combating violent extremist thought,
rehabilitation programs for extremists, and handling of
returned Guantanamo detainees. These efforts will have to
maneuver through a minefield of ROYG suspicions of Saudi
intentions for Yemen. The USG nevertheless should consider
how to use Saudi Arabia to address development in Yemen to
ameliorate the potential danger Yemen poses to stability in
the region. The British government already has a clear
policy, reiterated in donor meetings, of including talking
points on Yemen for UK Ministers visiting Saudi Arabia. The
Dutch Embassy has approached PolOff to ask for coordination
on a donor approach to Saudi Arabia's possible involvement.
Given their long, shared border and evident Saudi concern
about the effects of an unstable Yemen, we should be able to
convince Saudi Arabia that it needs to act in its own best
interest to ensure that its southern neighbor meets the
serious economic and political challenges that confront it.
The USG advocacy, however, must be tempered to ensure that
Saudi Arabia knows the USG does not/not aim to make Yemen a
vassal state.
SECHE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 001617
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD
NSC FOR AARON JOST
OSD/POLICY FOR BRIAN GLENN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS ECON SA UK GM YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN: HAMID AL-AHMAR SEES SALEH AS WEAK AND
ISOLATED, PLANS NEXT STEPS
REF: A. SANAA 1486
¶B. SANAA 299
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Hamid al-Ahmar, Islah Party leader,
prominent businessman, and de facto leader of Yemen’s largest
tribal confederation, claimed that he would organize popular
demonstrations throughout Yemen aimed at removing President
Saleh from power unless the president "guarantees" the
fairness of the 2011 parliamentary elections, forms a unity
government with leaders from the Southern Movement, and
removes his relatives from positions of power by December
¶2009. Ahmar told EconOff on August 27 that Saleh is now more
politically isolated than ever, deprived of the counsel and
support of former allies, and beleagured by more threats to
regime stability than he can handle. Ahmar said he would
work hard in the coming months to convince Northwest Regional
Commander Major General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, as well as the
Saudi government, to support the opposition. By his own
admission, however, Ahmar still lacks the necessary support,
even within his own opposition Dialogue Committee, to launch
broad-based anti-Saleh demonstrations. END SUMMARY.
GOVERNANCE REFORMS...OR ELSE
----------------------------
¶2. (C) Reiterating comments he made during an August 5
al-Jazeera interview (REF A), Hamid al-Ahmar, Islah Party
leader, prominent businessman, Member of Parliament, and de
facto head of the Hashid tribal confederation, told EconOff
on August 27 that he had given President Saleh until the end
of 2009 to "guarantee" the fairness of the 2011 elections,
form a unity government with the Southern Movement, and
remove his relatives from military leadership positions.
Absent this fundamental shift in Saleh’s governance of the
country, Ahmar will begin organizing anti-regime
demonstrations in "every single governorate," modeled after
the 1998 protests that helped topple Indonesian President
Suharto. "We cannot copy the Indonesians exactly, but the
idea is controlled chaos." Ahmar said he had conveyed his
ultimatum to Saleh through Ahmar’s brothers (NFI) in early
August, but had not yet received a response from the
president or his inner circle.
¶3. (C) Saleh is now at his weakest point politically,
besieged by threats on multiple fronts and without the
political support and counsel of key allies, according to
Ahmar. "(Presidential advisor Abdulkarim) al-Eryani is not
as honest nor as useful as he used to be, (Northwest Regional
Commander) Ali Muhsin (al-Ahmar) is no longer his ally, and
Sheikh Abdullah is no longer in the picture," he said,
referring to his late father, the former Speaker of
Parliament and Saleh’s key ally vis--vis the tribes. "Who
is left? He is all alone." Ahmar conceded that Saleh is
unlikely to meet any of his three conditions. "There’s
really no way to verify that Saleh is serious about free and
fair elections, but I won’t wait until the 2011 elections to
move forward."
SAUDIS, ALI MUHSIN KEY TO AHMAR’S PLANS
---------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Removing Saleh from power in a scenario that does
not involve throwing the country into complete chaos will be
impossible without the support of the (currently skeptical)
Saudi leadership and elements of the Yemeni military,
particularly MG Ali Muhsin, according to Ahmar. "The Saudis
will take a calculated risk if they can be convinced that we
can make Saleh leave the scene peacefully." Denying any
personal ambition to lead the country, Ahmar said that Yemen
needs a president from one of the southern governorates and
that the Saudis would eventually come around to the idea.
"If the Saudis were going to put anyone in power instead of
Saleh, it would be me -- everyone knows I am close to them
)- but I told them the next president must be a southerner,
for the sake of unity."
SANAA 00001617 002 OF 003
¶5. (S/NF) While Ali Muhsin’s support is essential to the
success of any plan to remove Saleh, he should not be allowed
to lead the country, Ahmar told EconOff. "Ali Muhsin is a
good, honest man, but the last thing we need is another
military man as president." Ahmar said he would seek to
exploit a rift between Saleh and Ali Muhsin, claiming that
the president had given Ali Muhsin the impossibly difficult
Sa’ada mission with the explicit intention of ruining his
military career, and therefore his presidential ambitions,
and hopefully have him killed in the process. Ahmar stressed
that he was only in the early stages of discussions with Ali
Muhsin on the topic of undermining Saleh’s rule.
BAD LEADERSHIP, FAILURE IN SA’ADA WILL TURN THE MILITARY
--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶6. (S/NF) Ahmar predicted that the failure of the current
military campaign in Sa’ada, along with the continued
presence of Saleh’s relatives in positions of leadership,
would eventually cause Saleh to lose the military’s loyalty.
Deriding Saleh’s son, Special Operations Forces Commander
Ahmed Ali, and his nephews Tariq, Yahya, and Ammar, as
"clowns" who keep the loyalty of their men only by providing
opportunities for corruption, Ahmar said the military would
not stay in the barracks indefinitely if it saw fighting in
Sa’ada as a futile enterprise under Saleh’s command. Ahmar
compared the ROYG forces currently in Sa’ada to the various
Ahmar-allied Hashid confederation tribes that had fought
against the Houthis during previous campaigns. (Note: GPC
Member of Parliament and Hashid leader Hussein al-Ahmar,
Hamid’s brother, recently met with members of the "Hashid
Popular Army" that fought on behalf of the ROYG in the last
round of fighting in Sa’ada, according to an August 30 press
report. End Note.) "A lot of blood was shed to make Sa’ada
Yemeni and now Saleh is close to wasting it all. Saleh has
lost the tribes and, this time, he will lose the military."
The only solution in Sa’ada is to arrest Houthi leader
Abdulmalik al-Houthi, according to Ahmar.
A VISION FOR ISLAH GOVERNANCE
-----------------------------
¶7. (C) Repeating comments he has made to EmbOffs in the past,
Ahmar described the Islah Party as a moderate force within
Yemeni society and described himself as a moderating element
within Islah’s leadership. Islah will govern like the
Turkish Welfare Party and "nobody fears extremism from
Turkey," Ahmar said. The only things Islah would impose upon
Yemeni society are a ban on the sale of alcohol and on
prostitution and escort services. "No one will be forced to
wear the headscarf and Yemenis will be allowed to do whatever
they want in their own homes )- bring your girlfriend home
and drink -- but just don’t do it public," Ahmar said.
(Note: Alcohol sales outside Western hotels are already
banned in Yemen. Islah regularly pushes the ROYG, with some
success, to shut down massage parlors in Sana’a that are
widely regarded as prostitution sites. End Note.) Ahmar
asked what concerns, if any, the U.S. has with Islah’s
platform and offered to make any changes that would ensure
U.S. support for Islah.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
-------------------
¶8. (C) Hamid al-Ahmar comes across as a confident, polished
interlocutor and speaks fluent English, despite having been
to the U.S. only twice, as a teenager. He is the most
ambitious of the 10 sons of the late Sheikh Abdullah
al-Ahmar, evidenced by his increasingly frequent public
appearances. His disgust with President Saleh, whom he
alternately refers to as "the devil" and "the greedy one," is
palpable and frequently expressed in conversations. Ahmar
views his late father’s support for Saleh with disdain and
seems to relish the fact that Saleh no longer has any
powerful tribal allies equal in stature to his father. Ahmar
and his family of Hashid tribesmen hail from Amran
SANAA 00001617 003 OF 003
governorate and claim Ali Muhsen al-Ahmar as a blood relative
-- "my tenth cousin, no closer," according to Ahmar.
President Saleh, born in the Bayt al-Ahmar village in the
Sanhan district, is not a blood relative of the Amran Ahmars
(REF B). Ahmar claims to talk to the president in person and
on the telephone "regularly."
¶9. (S/NF) Ahmar, who splits his time between Jeddah and a
palatial estate in Sana’a, is intimately involved in the
everyday dealings of the disparate subsidiaries and
affiliates of the business conglomerate he chairs -- the
Ahmar Group. Post estimates that the majority of his
official revenue stream comes from earnings at his telecom
company Sabafon, the Saba Islamic Bank, various import-export
companies, and his partnership with Siemens in the power
sector. To a lesser extent, he also derives income from
serving as the local agent for the London-based commodity
trading company Arcadia Petroleum, which regularly buys most
of the ROYG’s monthly crude oil share, and from owning a
string of Western fast-food restaurants. A number of our
contacts, including Ahmar’s brother-in-law Nabil Khamery,
have suggested that Ahmar, like his late father, receives
generous cash payoffs from the Saudi Government, which he
collects in Jeddah rather than through the Saudi Embassy in
Sana’a.
COMMENT
-------
¶10. (S) Hamid al-Ahmar has ambition, wealth, and tribal power
in abdundance, a fiery combination anywhere but especially in
Yemen. Despite his increasingly confrontational statements
in public and conspiratorial tone in private, however, Ahmar
realizes that he is in no position to seize power. By his
own admission, even members of the opposition Dialogue
Committee he leads are skeptical of the utility of mass
demonstrations targeting Saleh personally. Judging by his
non-reaction to Ahmar’s public call for him to resign, Saleh
is unlikely to view Ahmar’s latest ultimatum, conveyed
privately, as anything more than a mild irritation. It is
unclear how the military, supposedly chafing under the
command of Saleh’s son, nephews, and other Sanhan loyalists,
fits into Ahmar’s strategy of popular opposition protests.
Ahmar will likely remain a vocal opposition politician and a
businessman before all else. As a tribal leader from the
rival Bakil confederation recently put it to us: "What if
Hamid tries to overthrow President Saleh and fails? He’d end
up weaker than before and never recover." END COMMENT.
SECHE
S E C R E T SANAA 002052
NOFORN
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JAPHE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER SA YM
SUBJECT: SA’ADA SOLUTION REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT, FEWER
WEAPONS
REF: A. RIYADH 1491
¶B. RIYADH 1502
¶C. TDX-315/075037-09
Classified By: AMBASSADOR STEPHEN SECHE FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Ongoing, direct Saudi involvement in
the Sa’ada war, which in and of itself risks expanding the
regional and sectarian dimensions of the conflict, also seems
to be encouraging other Sunni neighbors to provide material
support to President Saleh’s ill-conceived campaign to
eradicate the Houthi rebellion through purely military means.
The SAG itself apparently has agreed to provide USD 62M in
weapons, ammunition and other supplies from its own stock to
the ROYG, and to finance additional deals with third parties.
We urge direct and immediate engagement with governments in
Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and other regional capitals (Cairo and
Amman come to mind) to convey clearly our view that their
interest in promoting a stable and secure Yemen is being
fundamentally undermined by the infusion of large amounts of
weapons to the ROYG, a substantial quantity of which can be
expected to be diverted into Yemen’s bustling grey arms
market and from there to points unknown. As important, the
message sent to Saleh through the provision of large amounts
of money and military assistance is that his neighbors
endorse his expressed intention to eliminate the Houthi
rebellion though purely military means, an effort that
already has resulted in enormous damage to the infrastructure
and civilian population of Sa’ada governorate with no end to
the war in sight. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S/NF) The initiation one week ago of Saudi air strikes
against Houthi fighters who attacked Saudi security forces
from positions on the border-straddling Jebel (Mount) Dukhan
opened a new chapter in the five-year old conflict, one that
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh appears eager to ensure
will be the last. "The war just started two days ago," he
declared on November 7, alluding to the initiation of the
Saudi airstrikes, adding that "the war will never stop, no
matter how much money or martyrs it costs." Since that
time, despite public statements by SAG officials that the
Saudi posture is purely defensive and that operations will
cease once Houthi fighters are driven from its territory,
open source and other reporting, including from Embassy
Riyadh (RefA), indicates that Saudi air strikes have
continued, and that the potential for the introduction of
ground forces cannot be dismissed.
¶3. (S/NF) Ref B, meanwhile, cites Saudi Arabia’s National
Guard (SANG) Asst Deputy Commander as telling A/S Shapiro in
Riyadh that "the sooner that Yemen finishes the Houthi, the
better it will be for them." This line of thinking, that
the Houthi rebellion can be "finished" militarily is both
dangerous and delusional. It ignores willfully the fact
that, after five military iterations (2004-09) and three
solid months of Yemeni air strikes (commencing August 12) and
ground operations, well-armed and -entrenched Houthi forces
continue to bedevil ROYG armed forces, which have suffered
substantial losses, both from battlefield casualties and
desertions. While the level of Houthi resilience, weapons
proficiency and tactical expertise can and should force us to
examine carefully claims of external support, the fact
remains that the ROYG has failed repeatedly to corroborate
its charges that the Houthi rebellion is the tip of the
Iranian/Hizballah spear in Yemen. Most recently, the ROYG has
failed to substantiate its extravagant, public claims that an
Iranian ship seized in the Red Sea off its coast on Oct 25
was carrying Iranian military trainers, weapons and
explosives destined for the Houthis. In fact, sensitive
reporting (RefC) suggests that the ship was carrying no
weapons at all.
¶4. (S/NF) It is, in fact, the amount of weapons the SAG and
at least one other neighboring state, the UAE, seem intent on
throwing at the Yemeni government that strikes us as a cause
for serious concern. We know that the Saudis have agreed to
provide the ROYG with APCs, weapons and ammunition and to
assist in the purchase of helicopters for the YAF. In
addition, we understand KSA is offering to purchase weapons
and ammo from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and that the
UAE has agreed to broker a similar deal with Bulgaria. We
believe this tidal wave of arms into Yemen, a nation already
awash in weapons, will encourage President Saleh to continue
to reject any suggestion that he attempt to find a negotiated
solution to his government,s conflict with the Houthis, and
prolong a clumsy military effort that has destroyed much of
Sa’ada’s infrastructure and created an IDP population in
excess of 150,000 people with no evidence that he is any
closer to dominating the Houthis than he was five years ago.
In addition, it is almost certain that a large amount of the
weapons now on offer will find their way into Yemen’s
thriving grey arms market, or be re-exported, a traditional
revenue stream for the Saleh government. From there, it is
anyone’s guess as to where the weapons will surface,
potentially even in the hands of extremist groups bent on
attacking Western interests in Yemen - and ironically,
Saudia Arabia and neighboring countries in the Gulf.
¶5. (S/NF). Comment. We can all agree that the Houthis are
a destabilizing element in Yemen, and that the ROYG has a
responsibility to defend its national territory against armed
insurgents. How the ROYG chooses to do so is a reasonable
subject for discussion, however. Furthermore, whether the
Houthis are (as the ROYG and its Sunni neighbors claim)
the instrument Iran has chosen to establish a beachhead in
the Arabian Peninsula remains unclear, although the fact that
after five years of conflict there is still no compelling
evidence of that link must force us to view this claim with
some skepticism. That said, we can think of few ways to
more effectively encourage Iranian meddling in the Houthi
rebellion than to have all of Yemen’s Sunni neighbors line
up to finance and outfit Ali Abdullah Saleh’s self-described
"Operation Scorched Earth" against his country’s Shia
minority. We urge the Department to engage in Washington and
in relevant capitals to convey to these "friends of Yemen"
that they are undermining their goal of a stable and secure
Yemen by providing large amounts of money and military
assistance to President Saleh. Not only will this infusion
of weapons contribute to Yemen’s internal instability, but
it will send a message to Saleh that his neighbors endorse
his preferred method of conflict resolution: armed force.
While there are moments when force must be employed, it
cannot be to the exclusion of other means that might spare
Yemen’s already neglected population further suffering and
deprivation. End Comment.
SECHE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002070

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: SAUDI STRIKES IN YEMEN: AN INVITATION TO IRAN --
AND THE U.S.? 

REF: SANAA 2053

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Saudi airstrikes on the Yemeni border
continue but have not managed to clear the area of Houthi
rebels. Yemeni journalists and the Houthis report Saudi
strikes are hitting Yemeni targets, claims that are denied by
the ROYG and SAG. Multiple media sources report the Saudi
Navy is imposing a blockade on ports along northern Yemen's
Red Sea coast. As Yemen's neighbors rush to offer the ROYG
additional weapons and munitions, Iranian officials denounce
the Saudi strikes and are calling for Islamic states to
defend innocent Shi'a from ROYG and SAG attacks. Yemeni
analysts fear that military action by Saudi Arabia is
creating a regional, sectarian war that will lead to direct
Iranian involvement. It is also possible that the Houthis
have sought to internationalize the conflict, either to
attract international support or to ensure that any
negotiated political solution would include international,
not ROYG, mediators. President Saleh appears to have gained
the most from recent developments, as he has finally obtained
direct political, financial, and military support for the war
from powerful neighbors -- who also happen to be close U.S.
allies. END SUMMARY.

Saudi strikes and clashes intensify
-----------------------------------

¶2. (SBU) Saudi airstrikes on the Yemeni border continue, but
have not managed to clear the area of Houthi rebels. On
November 14, Houthi fighters reportedly killed two Saudi
soldiers and injured five others in the Jebel al-Dukhan area,
which reportedly had come under Saudi control days earlier.
Though the ROYG and SAG deny it, the Houthis claim Saudi
bombardment of Yemeni territory continued November 12-15,
including in Malahit, Shada, Hasamah, and Haydan districts.
Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam told AFP on November 13
that Saudi bombing reached up to 60 kilometers inside Yemeni
territory.xxxxx told
PolOff xxxxx that the KSA is "hitting targets in
Yemen." Both xxxxx and xxxxx,
pointed out that Saudi officials have announced their
government's intention of establishing a "buffer zone" by
pushing the Houthis dozens of kilometers away from the
border. To achieve this goal, they argue, SAG would have to
bomb targets inside Yemen. According to Yemeni press, Saudi
newspaper al-Riyad reported that Houthi spokesman Abdulsalam
was killed in a November 15 Saudi airstrike on the Houthis'
media center in Razeh district )- a district that is inside
Yemeni territory.

Saudi ships patrolling off yemeni coast
---------------------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) Meanwhile, multiple media reported that Saudi
Arabia imposed a blockade on ports along northern Yemen's Red
Sea coast to prevent arms smuggling to the Houthis.
(Comment: These accounts of a blockade appear exaggerated, as
analysts question whether the Saudi Navy could physically
enforce one. End Comment.) However, the DATT reports the
Yemeni Coast Guard reached an agreement with the Saudi Navy
to blockade Midi Port. The two nations' maritime forces are
communicating about their anti-smuggling efforts, but it is
not clear to what extent, nor if their efforts are being
coordinated. (Comment: The maritime forces' activities are
presumably a reaction to the October 25 seizure of an
Iranian-crewed ship off the coast of Yemen's Midi Port that
was allegedly smuggling arms to the Houthis. The ROYG has
yet to produce evidence that Iranians were smuggling arms to
the Houthis, as the ship was apparently empty when it was
seized. However, echoing a claim Yemen Ambassador al-Hajjri
made recently, Foreign Minister Qirbi told PolChief on
November 15 the fact that the ship was empty indicated the
arms had already been delivered. End Comment.)

Neighbors rush to aid the royg
------------------------------

¶4. (S/NF) Across the region, governments are rushing to aid
the ROYG in its battle against the Houthis. The Saudis have
agreed to provide the ROYG with APCs, weapons, and ammunition
and to assist in the purchase of helicopters for the Yemeni
Air Force. The SAG is also offering to purchase weapons and
ammunition from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while the
UAE has agreed to broker a similar deal with Bulgaria

Sanaa 00002070 002 of 003

(reftel). Official media reported that the Kuwaiti
Ambassador to Yemen met with Minister of Interior Rashad
al-Masri on November 15 to discuss security cooperation,
presumably related to the war in Sa'ada.

Iranian indignation
-------------------

¶5. (SBU) On November 15, the Iranian parliament condemned
Saudi interference in the conflict and denounced the "killing
(of) Yemeni people by Saudi Arabian fighter jets." In its
statement, the Majlis urged "all sympathetic officials in the
Islamic world ... to utilize all their potential to stop this
tragedy and put an end to the killings," according to Tehran
Mehr News Agency. The Yemen Post reported on November 15
that the Speaker of Iran's Shura Council, Ali Larijani,
accused the US and Saudi Arabia of targeting Shi'ite rebels
in Yemen. In a statement posted on the Council's website, he
said the USG was an accomplice in the attacks against the
Houthis. Meanwhile, ROYG officials repeated their
accusations that Iran is funding the Houthis. In a November
15 al-Jazeera interview, General Yahya Saleh, the Qident's
nephew anQmmander of the Central Security Forces
Counter-Terrorism Unit, said there is "no doubt" Iran is
supporting the Houthis )- "the Houthis cannot fund and fight
this war with pomegranates and grapes or drugs," he said.

Houthis: "u.s. Plan to silence us"
----------------------------------

¶6. (SBU) The Houthis are also accusing the USG of
involvement in efforts to subdue them. On November 15,
Hizballah's al-Manar TV aired a telephone intervQwith
Houthi spokesman Abdulsalam in which he said the Saudis had
been compelled to strike the Houthis after the ROYG failed to
implement the "U.S. plan" to silence and subjugate the
Houthis. He said the allegations that the Houthis
infiltrated Saudi Arabia are nothing more than a pretext to
justify a "U.S.-Yemeni security plan" to prolong the war.
(Comment: This may refer to false reports in the official
Yemeni media that the USG and ROYG signed a military
agreement at the November 10-12 joint staff talks. While
Post issued a statement clarifying that no such agreement was
signed, the initial report, implying that the agreement will
aid Yemen's battle against the Houthis, was picked up by
Iran's Press TV and even Voice of America. End Comment.)

Implications of regionalization,
fears of saudi over-reaction
----------------------------

¶7. (C) Yemeni analysts believe Saudi involvement is creating
a regional sectarian war that will serve as an invitation to
Iranian involvement.xxxxx, told the Ambassador on November 15 that
Sa'ada residents are increasingly seeing the conflict as a
religious one and believe that the Houthis achieve
battlefield victories because God is on their side. He added
that Saudi Arabia's involvement is only encouraging the
Houthis and their supporters to see the conflict in sectarian
terms. He claimed the situation in Sa'ada is as bad as it is
because the religious factor helps the Houthis garner support
from the local population; by sharpening that aspect of the
conflict, Saudi involvement could mobilize additional support
for the Houthis, he concluded. Moreover, xxxxx
believes the Houthis might begin supporting Zaydis on the
Saudi side of the border, home to an estimated 2,000 Zaydi
Saudis. While they may not share the same grievances as
Zaydis in northern Yemen, if the conflict becomes
increasingly sectarian, Saudi Zaydis may find a new champion
in the Houthis, and the Houthis may find a new base of
support among the Saudi population. Furthermore, Qadhi told
PolOff on November 15 there is growing sentiment among
Iranians that they "should not leave Yemen's Shi'a alone to
face aggression from the Saudi and Yemeni governments."

¶8. (C) xxxxx fears that the guerrilla nature of the
war, in which small groups of Houthi fighters familiar with
the rugged terrain launch sneak attacks at a mighty foe,
could provoke the Saudis into over-reacting and causing
serious harm to civilians caught in the crossfire. Saudi
Arabia is using state-of-the-art weaponry against the
Houthis, but in more than a week of heavy bombings apparently
have not been able to clear them from the area. xxxxx says
if the "little brat in the neighborhood" can continue to

Sanaa 00002070 003 of 003

capture and kill Saudi soldiers, the KSA may not react
rationally and may begin targeting villages, markets, and
other civilian gathering places in order to root out the
insurgents.

Houthi gambit?
--------------

¶9. (C) What prompted the SAG's involvement in the war is a
subject of considerable speculation in Yemen. While
President Saleh has long been encouraging Saudi Arabia to
join the fight, most analysts believe the Houthis had reason
to provoke their involvement as well. xxxxx thinks the
Houthis attacked the Saudi border guards in order to
internationalize the conflict. "Maybe they drew in Saudi
Arabia because they wanted to negotiate with the master
rather than the servant," he told PolOff on November 15.
Havez al-Bukari, President of Yemen Polling Center, agrees
that the Houthis wanted to draw Saudi Arabia into the
conflict in order to get more attention from the
international community. According to Bukari, by
internationalizing the conflict, the Houthis' demands for
international mediation )- which the ROYG has refused,
insisting that any negotiations will be handled domestically
-) become much stronger. He believes the Houthis want a
foreign government or international body to broker dialogue
between the ROYG and the Houthis, since previous peace talks
were predominantly internal affairs. They want a "partner"
in the talks, not a "sponsor" of them, as he characterized
Qatar's role in mediating the 2008 Doha peace accord.

Comment
-------

¶10. (S/NF) The ROYG and the Houthis both stand to gain from
expanding the conflict beyond Yemen's borders: the ROYG
benefits from the military and financial might of its
powerful northern neighbor, while the Houthis are better
positioned to receive overt Iranian backing or to spur some
sort of international political settlement. Yet the benefit
to Saudi Arabia seems less clear. While the need to protect
its border is obvious, the airstrikes could backfire in a
number of ways. First, the SAG risks becoming embroiled in
an intractable guerrilla war. Second, Saudi involvement
fuels the ROYG's perception that the real, immediate threat
to the Arabian Peninsula is the Houthis, not al-Qaeda.
Third, as noted reftel, by transferring millions of dollars
worth of weapons to the ROYG, there is a strong chance the
very same weapons will leak into the gray market and end up
being used against Saudi Arabia by terrorists. Fourth, it
invites Iranian involvement )- which creates a
self-fulfilling prophecy, since the fear that Iran was at
Saudi's doorstep is partly what motivated the strikes in the
first place.

¶11. (S/NF) COMMENT CONTINUED. In the short-term at least,
it seems like President Saleh has gained the most from the
Saudis' entry into the conflict. His glee when the Saudis
launched their airstrikes indicates he finally received what
he has been pushing for )- political, financial, and direct
military support for the war from Yemen's powerful neighbor
and principal benefactor. He will use this support to battle
the Houthis as well as to send a signal of the regime's
staying power to other domestic actors who may seek to
undermine it. Saleh will not rest with Saudi support,
however, and will doubtlessly rely on the SAG to advocate
some measure of USG involvement, given our strong ties to
Riyadh. END COMMENT.
Seche






	

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