It’s easy to say in hindsight but there should not be any surprise that Mohammed Mursi and Ahmed Shafiq have come on top – by fair means or foul – in the first round of voting in Egypt’s presidential elections. The reason is that The State vs Muslim Brotherhood has been the only game in town for years, in the sense that it is these two institutions that use institutional power to generate political campaigns and garner votes.

One of the tendencies of media at least in its approach towards the election is that it was framed as a question of charismatic individuals fighting it out to lead the nation, if only symbolically or with reduced powers, according to the final conclusion of the squabbling over the constitution and division of presidential and parliamentary remits. There were too many well-known and popular candidates – Hamdeen Sabahi, Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh and Amr Moussa – outwith the traditional political machinery, who were blind to the obvious: they were going to split the vote.

One writer defined this as a grey area of the central political territory where Egyptians had lost interest in the desire for definition and clear policies. These sentiments were likely encouraged by the Abbasiyya violence, and if there is more street mobilization in the wake of this vote, it could affect Mursi’s ability to win on a united pro-revolution ticket. But in any case this middle accounts for roughly half the electorate, which is hardly inconsiderable (not to mention the fact the silent half of the electorate which abstained from the vote). The question now is whether, if there is really ideological common ground there, these candidates can overcome personal differences to form the party machinery that can rake in votes when it comes to elections. As it is, this was more of a beauty contest where the professional approach of the two old-timers, the MB and The State, hijacked the process.

The Brotherhood’s get-the-vote-out prowess is well-known, but one issue is where Shafiq managed to do what he did without the structures of the old National Democratic Party in place. The NDP was really just a front for the manipulation of security services and the military-security complex is very much still there and fighting to survive this period intact. It’s interesting to note that neither Mursi nor Shafiq are particularly known, popular or charismatic characters: they may have represented ideas – Mubarak-era security vs political Islam – but they also had powerful institutions behind them to promote those ideas, whoever the face on the front was.

So perhaps there are less reasons for disillusion. This is early days. Sabahi and Abu al-Futuh in particular have shown that that there is a vast public out there interested in the much-maligned centre, but it has to mobilize and play politics more effectively. For the MB and The State, this is perhaps the last time they’ll be able to dominate the stage like this.