The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the concomitant blow to the Egyptian security establishment has been the main take-away issue for governments around the Arab world from last year’s political upheaval. Egyptian security played a central role in coordinating with security agencies around the region and identifying enemies: the Brotherhood and its affiliates were among them, not least in the Gulf where the death of Nayef – the fat cat who masterminded the no-nonsense, no-dissent state – is a new challenge for the old order.
The Brotherhood’s rise is of concern to them for two reasons: the changes in Egyptian policy that could result from the empowerment of the group in Egypt itself – drawing closer to Iran, Hamas and pressuring conservative outfits like Al Saud over their US-friendly foreign policy – and the encouragement their ascent will give to sympathizers in the Gulf. However the Gulf countries are not only the same page: some have kept close to them, some have kept their distance.
On one side is Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, on the other is Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Brotherhood Hadas group has been a part of Kuwait’s parliamentary political scene for a long time and Kuwait is an open arena for Islamists around the Gulf to meet and discuss. Similarly, Bahrain’s al-Minbar group is the political front for the Brotherhood ideologues, and the authorities have drawn closer to them in the past year as they shore up their alliances with Sunni Islamist groups in the face of Shi’ite political Islam (though the irony here is that the Egyptian Brotherhood in their political activism and organization resemble Wefaq more than Minbar or anyone else). In Qatar there is no political life per se within which Brotherhood affiliates can operate, but the state has cosseted and propagated the group’s thinking through hosting Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, the Mufti of Al-Jazeera.
There is no political life in Saudi Arabia but clerics and Islamists who identify with Brotherhood thinking are well-known. They have been encouraged by the events of the last year, organizing seminars in coordination with Kuwaitis and Qataris under the Nahda banner (the title of the Brotherhood presidential candidate’s campaign in Egypt, name of Tunisia’s Brotherhood calque, and title of a Qatar-based group set up by Jassim Al-Sultan) and strongly supporting the revolutionary ferment and reform politics, pro-participation and anti-corruption, on Twitter. Sheikh Salman al-Odah – turfed off of MBC last year for his enthusiastic welcome of events in Egypt and Tunisia – wrote of Mohammed Mursi’s apparent win in Egypt’s presidential election: “If Mohammed Mursi had asked to meet President Hosni Mubarak during his rule, he would have been ridiculed, and today the people choose him as the first man… Praise be to He who manages affairs!”
The UAE has been more public than Saudi Arabia over its concern about the Brotherhood. The Emirates revoked the nationality of seven Islamists, and Dubai police chief Dhahi Khalfan launched a Twitter war against Qaradawi in April after he criticized the UAE for its crackdown on Brotherhood figures and deportation of some Syrians for staging protests (despite the Saudi/Qatari campaign to bring down al-Assad). The UAE’s fear of the Brotherhood stems from its unique socio-economic situation: Islamist ability to tap into Emirati angst over the domination of foreigners and values. Tellingly, the accusations against the men in a shrill campaign on social media accused them of simultaneously being Ikhwan and Iran/Shia lovers. While this seems contradictory at first glance, it reflects another concern of ruling elites: as is typical of political Islam, the Brotherhood does not have an ideological problem with Iran, or Hizbullah, as Shi’ite entities, they are prepared to work with them as fellow travelers in the challenge to Western hegemony. Thus the traditional preference in Riyadh for promotion of Saudi Salafism, or al-Wahhabiyya: it dislikes Shia as a point of principle and has no ambition to rule in its own right, preferring an adjunct role as counseller to and servant of the ruler.
What all this speaks of is division among Gulf states over how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood and how the organisation’s success is playing into rivalries that already exist among them. Some Saudis defend Qatar’s promotion of the Islamists as a shrewd move to get close to them and know what they are up to, others suspect Doha is simply trying to cause mischief for Al Saud. Whether Egypt’s military council continues to out-manoeuvre the Brotherhood or not, these schisms are set to intensify.
